Epistemic injustice

Summary

Epistemic injustice names wrongs within knowing: prejudice can reduce a person's credibility, and unequal interpretive resources can prevent experience becoming intelligible.

Implications for practice

It gives the atlas a sharper way to examine whose evidence is admitted and which absences are produced by the field's own categories.

Key distinctions

• testimonial injustice
• hermeneutical injustice
• ignorance versus structured absence
• representation versus authority to know

Historical development

• social epistemology
• virtue epistemology
• feminist philosophy

Ideas it depends on

• testimony
• interpretive resources
• social power

Further developments

• epistemic exclusion
• corrective epistemic practices

Connections to practice

• participation design
• source policy
• canon review

Common confusions

• Adding more speakers does not by itself change credibility rules or interpretive resources.

Further checks

• Connect to standpoint, situated knowledge and decolonial epistemologies through primary sources.

Recorded connections

Check the wording, direction, scope, sources, and status of a connection before relying on it.

• Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing develops the distinction of Epistemic injustice

  Status: accepted · Relation: develops

  Uses the book's own conceptual vocabulary.

  Locator: Oxford Academic abstract and contents

  • Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (checked)

Sources and passage locators

• Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (checked)

Cite this entry

Taylor, B. P. (2026). Epistemic injustice. The Necessary Tangle, release 0.35. https://transduction.systems/entries/concept_epistemic_injustice/

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